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To outside observers, Musharraf ’s fall from 
electoral grace was apparently triggered by 
his (second) unconstitutional grab for power 
– the declaration of martial law, the sacking of 
the country’s top judges, the failure to protect 
Benazir Bhutto from assassination – along 
with his increasingly unpopular alliance with 
the United States in seeking to drive ethnic 
Pashtun Islamic fundamentalists from their 
refuges along the border with Afghanistan. 
But while no one disputes that these events all 
mattered, analysts close to the ground argue 
that the proximate cause of Musharraf ’s 
humbling was his inability to contain food 
and fuel infl ation – and, more generally, his 
failure to improve the living standards of the 
great majority of Pakistanis who have yet to 
share in the bounty from Asia’s economic 
awakening.
The reason, I suspect, that foreigners have 
largely overlooked the infl uence of economic 
factors in the president’s defeat is that Paki-
stan has paradoxically experienced one of the 
best economic growth records in the region 
over the past eight years – a sharp contrast to 
decades of doldrums under his predecessors, 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. They ran 
up huge foreign debts, frittered away public 
resources on a bloated military establishment, 
and aided the country’s tiny economic elite in 
corrupting public life. Both unemployment 
and poverty rose in the 1990s, undermining 
the efforts of Pakistan’s middle class to mod-
ernize the economy and fueling religious ex-
tremism in the countryside.
After General Musharraf seized power in a 
coup in October 1999, he nominally commit-
ted his government to reforms intended to 
address stagnation. And by gross measures, 
they seem to have worked: the economy has 
grown by almost 50 percent since his ascen-
sion to power, with income per capita rising 
by nearly 25 percent. 
What’s more, under Musharraf, foreign di-
rect investment quadrupled and (measured) 
unemployment declined from 8.3 percent in 
2001-2 to 6.2 percent in 2005-6. Infl ation, 
which had been running in double digits 
through most of the 1990s, averaged just 5.6 
percent. Even the war in Afghanistan in 2001, 
the discovery that Pakistani scientists had 
been selling nuclear weapons technology to 
the highest bidders, and a devastating 2005 
earthquake failed to derail what until recently 
defeat of President Pervez Musharraf ’s 
party in parliamentary elections earlier this year was no surprise, inside Pakistan or 
out. But explanations for his thumping at the polls vary, and how one interprets the 
return to democracy matters a lot in predicting how this politically unstable, ethni-
cally divided, nuclear-armed country will react to continuing stresses. 
The overwhelming
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appeared to many to be the beginning of a 
sustained period of East-Asian-style growth. 
What, then, has recently gone so badly wrong?
potemkin reforms 
Soon after taking power, the new government 
initiated a macroeconomic stabilization pro-
gram as well as a series of institutional re-
forms aimed at the constraints that weighed 
heavily on the economy. The strategy had 
four sensible goals:
1. Improving fi scal and monetary discipline, 
as well as restoring working relationships 
with key foreign lenders, including the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank.
2. Attacking market-distorting regulation 
that enriched Pakistan’s parasitic crony capi-
talist class.
3. Improving governance in a country bur-
dened with a huge and incompetent bureau-
cracy, a culture of corruption and a rapacious 
economic elite.
4. Reducing poverty, especially poverty in 
the countryside, where landless workers all 
too often must survive on the equivalent of a 
few dollars a day.
Musharraf ’s fi rst economic priority (apart 
from tilting the government patronage ma-
chine toward his allies) was to attract private 
foreign investment, both to supplement inad-
equate domestic savings and to modernize 
industry. Once growth was jump-started, the 
reasoning went, resources would become 
available to contain terrorism and to satiate 
the military’s appetite for good living and 
high-tech weaponry. Even more important, 
the surplus generated by rapid growth could 
be spent on reducing poverty and building 
critically needed infrastructure, thus dimin-
ishing the attractions of extremism to Paki-
stanis at the bottom of the pecking order. 
All told, Musharraf ’s supporters argued 
that this process would lead to a virtuous cir-
cle in which a decline in extremism and pov-
erty would lead to even greater infl ows of 
capital. The economic reform agenda and the 
government’s commitment to containing ex-
tremism were thus sold to foreign donors and 
to anxious Pakistanis as complements.
Evaluating the country’s economic perfor-
mance during the Musharraf years is diffi cult 
because the analysts closest to the ground are 
often bitterly partisan. But one approach is to 
use the World Bank’s more objective, quanti-
tative approach to measuring progress in in-
stitutional reform. To achieve sustainable 
growth, the World Bank says that governance 
must be adequate by six key measures: (1) 
voice and accountability, (2) political stabil-
ity, (3) government effectiveness, (4) regula-
tory qual ity, (5) rule of law, and (6) control 
of corruption. 
Although Musharraf was able to realize 
gains in government effectiveness and regula-
tory quality, much of this progress was neu-
tralized by increased corruption. In addition, 
Pakistan under Musharraf experienced a 
major decline in voice and accountability, 
falling from the 27th percentile among na-
tions in 1998 by World Bank measure to the 
13th in 2006. Political stability, which started 
in the bottom 10 percent worldwide, declined 
to a truly wretched bottom 5 percent in 2006. 
A similarly inconsistent pattern is seen in 
measures of economic freedom. Major gains 
were made in the ability to start, operate and 
close businesses. And while the corporate tax 
rate remained high, tax revenue and govern-
ment spending were low relative to GDP. 
Trade liberalization progressed in fi ts and 
starts, but tariff- and non-tariff barriers to 
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imports, inconsistent administration of prod-
uct standards, non-transparent government 
procurement, highly selective export subsi-
dies, weak enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights and rampant corruption added 
considerably to the cost of trade. The net ef-
fect, alas, undermined the government’s ef-
forts to integrate the country into the world 
economy: Pakistan (by the World Bank’s 
reckoning) declined from the 50th most glo-
balized country in 2003 to 63rd in 2007. 
Pakistan fared no better on the Milken In-
stitute’s Capital Access Index. Over all, the 
economy slipped from 65th place worldwide 
in 2003 to 72nd in 2007, among 122 econo-
mies. Pakistan’s rankings for separate compo-
nents of the index only accent the decline. 
While the macroeconomic environment rank-
ing improved marginally (from 112th in 2005 
to 104th by 2007), it plummeted in equity 
The World Bank concluded that Pakistan suffered 
from a dearth of water, irrigation, power and 
transportation infrastructure, and warned that the 
gaps could lead to increased social discontent.
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market development (15th to 40th) and bond 
market development (52nd to 63rd). 
Pakistan did attract more foreign invest-
ment, but most of the funds went to build ca-
pacity to meet domestic demand rather than 
going into export-oriented businesses. The 
Musharraf regime also failed to address the 
supply bottlenecks that inevitably result from 
a growth spurt. In particular, the government 
had no plan for meeting increased demand 
for electricity and gas – or the will to parse 
limited capacity in a rational way. By 2006-7, 
the situation had developed into a full-blown 
crisis, as power shortages led many compa-
nies to reduce working hours. 
More broadly, the World Bank concluded 
that Pakistan suffered from a dearth of water, 
irrigation, power and transportation infra-
structure. Indeed, the bank presciently warned 
that the gaps could lead to increased social 
discontent, as well as confl ict between the 
central government and the provinces.
The Musharraf government failed to un-
dertake the major reforms in the tax system. 
As a result, the tax base remains narrow and 
the impact of taxation is deeply regressive. 
Just 2 percent of the population pays direct 
(income-determined) taxes, with most of the 
revenue that is generated coming from the 
middle class. All told, about 70 percent of 
Pakistan’s revenues are from regressive sales 
and transaction taxes. And the rapacious 
land-owning class escapes almost scot-free: 
agriculture represents 23 percent of GDP, but 
carries just 1 percent of the tax burden. Man-
ufacturing, the sector that must grow rapidly 
if Pakistan is to prosper, contributes 18 per-
cent of GDP but generates 62 percent of taxes. 
Adding salt to the wound, the poor benefi ted 
only modestly from the economic expansion 
because most of the growth in GDP came 
from sectors – largely skilled services – that 
provided few jobs for lower income groups. 
Another area in which Musharraf has 
failed to make progress is in containment of 
the economic power of the military. Over the 
years, Pakistan’s army has expanded its sprawl-
ing property holdings with the goal of ensur-
ing that it retains both organizational auton-
omy and the income with which to butter the 
bread of the offi cer class. For example, the 
armed forces control some 11.6 million acres 
of land, much of it leased at trivial rent to fa-
vored personnel. Estimates of total wealth of 
this (literal) military-industrial complex 
range as high as $100 billion.
Finally, the country is once again facing 
the risk of running chronic current account 
defi cits. During the Musharraf years, efforts 
to increase private investment achieved some 
success, with the rate increasing from 14 per-
cent of GDP in 2001-2 to 18 percent in 
2006-7. During this period, however, national 
savings declined from 19 percent of GDP to 
18 percent, implying that the economy has 
become became increasingly dependent on 
foreign capital. This is likely to become a 
major problem, as foreign investors respond 
warily to the country’s political instability 
and imports of $130-a-barrel oil consume an 
ever-increasing portion of foreign exchange 
earnings. 
t r e n d s
 Among other, nearly intrac-
table problems, the country’s 
powerful armed forces is wed 
to the status quo — and in 
the past, has not hesitated 
to push back hard when chal-
lenged by civilians. 
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The signal advantage of Musharraf ’s eco-
nomic policies was their pro-business tilt, 
which gave companies a bit more room to op-
erate. Yet, while this policy unleashed consid-
erable entrepreneurial activity in the cities, it 
was not supported by a lightening of the bur-
den of economic regulation, improvements 
in fi nancial regulation, or a dedication to the 
rule of law –  all of which are necessary to 
transform a spasm of growth into sustained 
development. 
Seen in this light, the best explanation for 
Musharraf ’s early economic successes comes 
down to good luck and transient factors – a 
combination of a windfall in American aid 
designed to keep Pakistan in line on Afghani-
stan, good weather for agriculture, and a 
fl ood of remittances from Pakistanis working 
in the booming Gulf countries. Pakistan’s 
subsequent bad luck – disappointments in 
agricultural productivity, increased global 
competition in textile exports, and global 
commodity price infl ation – has seemingly 
returned the economy to stagnation-as-usual. 
what next?
In most countries, the slowing of growth does 
not cause political convulsions. But in Paki-
stan, growth did little to bind the body politic 
because the institutions of the ancien regime 
never really changed and the fruits of growth 
were so inequitably distributed. While no rig-
orous studies of income distribution are 
available for the last several years, a former 
Pakistani fi nance minister, Shahid Javed Burki, 
estimates that around 10 million Pakistanis – 
out of a population of about 160 million – 
benefi ted from the economic growth and the 
modest successes at restructuring under 
Musharraf. Furthermore, he noted, growth 
has been geographically concentrated in the 
industrialized belt of central and northern 
Pun jab and in the large cities, increasing ethnic 
tensions and leaving much of the country to 
stew in poverty and Islamic fundamentalism.
Hilton Root of George Mason University 
argues that Pakistan is most unstable toward 
the end of failed cyclical efforts to bring the 
economy out of stagnation. In 1970, such fail-
ure under General Ayub Khan led to the civil 
war between East Pakistan, home to the coun-
try’s economic elite, and West Pakistan, home 
to ethnic Bengalis. Similar, but less dramatic, 
changes took place in the late 1980s with the 
violent end to the corrupt, authoritarian rule 
of General Zia-ul-Haq. Fortunately, this time 
around, the bloodshed was relatively modest. 
There’s no compelling reason to believe, 
then, that the rejection of President Mushar-
raf ’s party and its replacement with a demo-
cratically elected civilian government means 
Pakistan is about to embark on the sorts of 
governance reform and institution building 
that it never managed before. Among other, 
nearly intractable problems, the country’s 
powerful armed forces is wed to the status 
quo – and in the past, has not hesitated to 
push back hard when challenged by civilians. 
Pakistan, in short, is a failed state. And failed 
states rarely have happy endings.
PAKISTAN AT A GLANCE
GDP per capita (purchasing power, 2007) $2,600
GDP per capita (at exchange rate, 2007) $770
Infl ation rate July ’07–Feb ’08  8.9%
Life expectancy at birth 65 years 
Average children per female 3.7
Infant mortality (under age 1) 6.8%
Population under 15 37%
Male literacy (age 15-24) 77%
Female literacy (age 15-24) 51%
Male primary school attendance 62%
Female primary school attendance 51%
Population with clean water 91% 
sources: Unicef; CIA World Factbook; Government of Pakistan
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